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1 Introduction
In this paper, we build a continuous-time general equilibrium model of a two-country, pure-exchange
economy with imperfectly integrated financial markets. We have a unique perishable good, a "Lucas
tree" in each country and taxes on the repatriation of dividends which capture the imperfect integration
of capital markets. Our main achievement is to determine endogenously both asset substituability (i.e.
asset returns correlation) and portfolios composition for diﬀerent degrees of financial integration. This
constitutes a first attempt to give a full description of equilibrium in-between the polar cases of perfect
integration and total segmentation. We believe our setting is appropriate to make sense of a) the extent
of international portfolio diversification, b) asset prices joint dynamics and c) their evolution over the
past decades.
The broad stylized facts that are in the background of this work are related to the large increase in
international financial linkages that occurred in the last twenty years. Over this period, industrialized
countries and emerging markets opened their capital account to foreign investors and many obstacles to
international capital flows were relaxed. This wave of institutional financial opening led to a huge rise
in cross-border asset holdings (see Lane et al. [2003]). Of course, countries do still exhibit a substantial
“home bias”, but less substantial than as first documented by French and Poterba [1991] : while US
investors held 94% of the US stock market in 1989, this number had decreased to 88% in 2001 (see
Amadi [2004] and Chan et al. [2005]). On the asset prices side, there is massive evidence of a steady
increase in comovements between countries: for instance, since the early 1970’s the correlation between
US monthly stock returns (on the S&P500 index) and returns on a synthetic non-US world index has
gained 0.1 each decade, rising continuously from 0.4 in 1970 to 0.71 in 2000 1 . Even though return
correlation cannot be interpreted unambiguously as a measure of integration without making reference to
fundamentals, the observed increase in prices comovements is probably related to the process of financial
integration. Bekaert and Harvey [2000] and Walti [2004] find evidence of a positive relationship between
the level of financial market integration and stock return correlations.
Overall, it seems that international financial markets are in a loose sense neither totally segmented
1 In August 2004, the correlation (over a 5-year window) had risen up to 0.82.
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nor perfectly integrated. But where in-between do we stand? Another way to put it is the following:
If markets were perfectly integrated, all investors would hold the same portfolio, the “world market
portfolio”, independently of their country2 — but do the large deviations from this benchmark case found
in the data3 allow us to say that we are “far” from a perfectly integrated world? Addressing this question
in a proper way calls for a rigorous definition of the notion of “financial integration”, which amounts to
the choice of a particular metric.
Assessing “integration” can be done by looking at several observable variables: prices, returns, port-
folios, consumption, regulations... Based on these observations, the literature typically performs binary
tests which take either perfect integration or full segmentation as a null hypothesis4 . The question we
ask is rather: what should the size of underlying impediments to cross-border equity holdings be to match
the empirical evidence on international asset portfolios? Our contribution is to build a model in which
this question is meaningful and can be given a proper answer through calibration. In our model, financial
markets are institutionally open and they are “pricewise” perfectly integrated (in the sense of Chen and
Knez [1995], or Rose [2003]): both the law of one price and no-arbitrage prevail on financial markets.
But in terms of portfolios, markets appear far from being integrated.
What is the view of the world resulting from our calibration exercise? We believe international
financial markets are characterized by a combination of high asset substituability (following from high
fundamental comovements) and small barriers to cross-border holdings resulting in substantial home
bias in porfolios. An important message conveyed by this paper is the following: deviations from the
world market portfolio per se are not informative on the size of frictions on financial markets — this
is all conditional on asset substituability. In a world characterized by high international comovements,
portfolios can exhibit large deviations from the “world market portfolio” even though obstacles to foreign
equity holdings are quite small.
2 In theory, this proposition only holds under quite restrictive assumptions: it would fail to be true if investors faced
idiosyncratic shocks unhedgeable because of some market incompleteness — or in presence of some information asymetries.
Deviations from purchasing power parity (possibly related to trade costs) constitute another source of departure from the
benchmark if assets pay in nominal terms (Adler and Dumas [1983]).
3 In particular, countries do invest much more in geographically close economies (Portes and Rey [1999]) or in their
trading partner countries (Aviat and Coeurdacier [2004]).
4 For instance, see tests of the international asset pricing model, e.g. Dumas and Solnik [1995]. A notable exception is
Chen and Knez [1995] who provide a non parametric measure of integration by taking the distance between state-prices
measures.
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Throughout the paper, we present qualitative and quantitative results on the impacts of “financial
integration”, by which we mean a decrease in impediments to foreign equity holdings. In our framework,
as taxes on the repatriation of dividends decrease, asset prices increase (consistently with evidence in
Henry [2000] and Bekaert [2000]), international returns correlation and cross-country equity holdings both
also increase (the latter eﬀect is of first-order, the former of second-order) while asset prices volatility
diminishes (also a second-order eﬀect). The overall impact of financial integration on the cost of funds is
not clear-cut, depending on the respective size of the decrease in risk premium (due to a better access to
diversification opportunities) and of the increase in the risk free rate (due to lower precautionary saving).
This may explain why the negative relationship between the cost of capital and market integration has
been extremely diﬃcult to find in the data (Stulz [1999]). Also, as a by-product of our model, we derive a
gravity equation for trade in financial claims, giving theoretical foundations to recent empirical papers in
international finance (see Portes and Rey [2005], Aviat and Coeurdacier [2004], Lane and Milesi-Feretti
[2004], Coeurdacier and Guibaud [2004]).
Technically, the diﬃculty of our model consists in solving for a dynamic general equilibrium with
heterogenous investors, the heterogeneity being induced by diﬀerential taxation. As a consequence of this
feature, the equilibrium allocation is not Pareto eﬃcient (this is like in Basak and Gallmeyer [2003]) and
we cannot use the pricing kernel of a single representative investor holding the world market portfolio
to price assets. In order to solve for equilibrium we use a stochastic Pareto-Negishi weight à la Cuoco
and He [1994]. Under the assumption of logarithmic utility and lognormal dividend processes in each
country, we are able to give approximate closed-form expressions for asset prices, equity portfolios and
assets returns joint dynamics, as functions of a few state-variables. We make Taylor expansions in the
neighborhood of the case of perfect integration, for which Cochrane, Longstaﬀ and Santa-Clara [2003]
obtain exact closed-form expressions. In this way, we endogenously determine the joint dynamics of asset
prices (given the dynamics followed by the fundamentals) and we can see how it is aﬀected by a variation
in obstacles to foreign equity holdings5 .
In our model like in Cochrane, Longstaﬀ and Santa-Clara [2003], asset prices joint dynamics are partly
driven by “portfolio rebalancing”. This mechanism induces the correlation of stock returns to be higher
5 We assume that fundamentals are not aﬀected by the integration process — as could be the case due to specialization
or more risk-taking as a response to new risk-sharing opportunities, a possibility emphasized in Obstfeld [1994].
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than the correlation of the “fundamentals” solely because some investors hold both assets. To catch the
intuition for this mechanism, take the case of two countries and two assets, one in each country, with
imperfectly correlated dividends and consider the impact on asset prices of a good shock on domestic
dividends. If both markets are completely segmented, this good shock on the domestic asset will drive its
price up without aﬀecting the foreign asset price. If on the contrary both markets are perfectly integrated,
the increase in the domestic asset price will lead the investor to rebalance part of her portfolio towards the
foreign asset — because her exposure to domestic risk has increased with the increase in the domestic asset
price. The required rate of return on the foreign asset decreases (because its diversification property are
now more cherished) and the foreign asset price must increase to restore equilibrium6 . This rebalancing
eﬀect naturally leads to more comovement between domestic and foreign asset prices than in the fully-
segmented world. In-between the two polar cases, the same logic operates monotonously: the lower the
frictions between two markets, the higher the comovements of their stock prices, for a given correlation of
the fundamentals. We shall insist on the fact that the “portfolio rebalancing” eﬀect, though spectacular
for low levels of fundamental correlation and no friction on financial markets (the case emphasized by
Cochrane et al. [2003]), is quantitatively small for a realistic calibration of the model parameters.
To our knowledge, a joint analysis of portfolio diversification and of the endogenous determination
of asset prices dynamics in imperfectly integrated financial markets was lacking in the literature. Black
[1974], Errunza and Losq [1985,1989], Eun and Jarakiramanan [1986], were studying the impact of in-
ternational financial barriers on porfolio holdings and asset pricing in a static mean-variance framework,
leaving no room to “portfolio rebalancing” eﬀects. Actually, few papers in the literature adopt a multi-
asset setting and derive asset return processes from fundamental dynamics. Our theoretical contribution
completes the analyses by Dumas, Harvey and Ruiz [2003] and Cochrane, Longstaﬀ and Santa-Clara
[2003] which both restrict their attention to the two polar cases of complete segmentation and perfect
integration. The paper closest to our analysis is Bhamra [2002]: he considers situations of “intermediate
integration”, but he imposes constraints directly on the amount of wealth that can be invested abroad,
which is unsatisfactory since what is important is precisely to understand why the amounts invested
in foreign assets are low. Serrat [2001] is another example of a multi-asset dynamic general equilibrium
6 In Cochrane et al., it is typically true that the partial derivative of the price function of an asset with respect to the
dividends of the other asset is positive, but it is not true in all states.
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asset-pricing model, but he restricts his focus on portfolios and he emphasizes the presence of non-tradable
goods as the main source of home bias.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of the model and
gives a first characterization of equilibrium in the general case. Section 3 solves the model using Taylor
expansions around the case of perfect risk-sharing and derives the implications of imperfect market
integration for asset prices dynamics, portfolio allocations and the cost of capital. Section 4 is devoted
to discussions and comments and section 5 concludes. The proofs of the main propositions are relegated
in a separate appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Setup
We consider a continuous time economy with an infinite horizon. There are two countries, home (H) and
foreign (F ), and a single perishable good. Each country has a representative agent with utility functional
Uit = Et
·Z +∞
t
e−ρ(s−t) log(cis)ds
¸
where cis is the consumption rate in country i and ρ is the common rate of time preference.
There are stocks in each country (in constant net supply normalized to one) giving a claim to an
exogeneously specified positive dividend process Di following a geometric brownian motion:
dDi
Di
= µDidt+ σ
T
DidW
(1,2) (2,1)
, i = H,F (1)
All uncertainty is generated by the 2-dimensional brownian motionW(t). We denote by η the correlation
of the two dividend growth rates, which we henceforth refer to as the "fundamental correlation"7 .
Throughout, we use bold cases for vectors and matrices and AT to denote the transpose of A.
Investors from country i are subject to an exogenous constant tax τ j on the dividend received from
stocks of country j (0 < τ j < 1)8 . Hence, a domestic agent who holds a unit of foreign stock receives
the instantaneous dividend (1 − τF )DF dt. When τ i = 0, country i is perfectly integrated to capital
7 We have: η =
σDH1σDF 1+σDH2σDF 2q
(σ2DH1
+σ2DH2
)(σ2DF 1
+σ2DF 2
)
.
8 One might argue that the asymmetric taxation should also apply to capital gains. We have to use this simpler setup
to make the model tractable.
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markets (whereas when τ i is close enough to 1, country i is segmented). Asymmetric taxation is a real
world feature and we believe that in this literal interpretation any number between 10% and 15% would
be realistic. However, we mean this diﬀerential tax treatment between foreign and domestic dividends to
capture more generally any barrier to cross-border equity holdings.
Besides the two risky assets, there is a "locally" riskless bond in zero net supply earning an interest
rate r. The bond price satisfies
dB
B
= rdt
The interest rate process — as well as the processes for the drift coeﬃcients and diﬀusion vectors of
asset prices to be defined below — will be determined in equilibrium.
We assume that taxes are redistributed to investors as endowments such that the following market-
clearing condition holds at each instant in the goods market : cH + cF = DH + DF (we will specify
later the way we redistribute collected taxes in the economies). Finally, we call D ≡ DH +DF the total
endowment of the world economy. It is immediate from (1) that D(t) has the following dynamics:
dD
D
= [δ(t)µDH + (1− δ(t))µDF ]| {z }
≡µD
dt+
£
δ(t)σTDH + (1− δ(t))σ
T
DF
¤| {z }
≡σTD
dW
where δ(t) ≡ DH(t)
DH(t) +DF (t)
The variable δ, which captures the relative size of the two economies, will be a key state-variable in the
model.
2.2 Admissible asset prices dynamics
Due to diﬀerential taxation, a same stock does not have the same after-tax expected return for the two
investors; but still, both investors have to agree on prices. This will be possible because investors, holding
diﬀerent portfolios, will not have the same perception of risk.
We will denote by SH the price of the domestic stock and SF the price of the foreign stock and we
will assume that in equilibrium SH and SF both follow Ito processes. We denote by µij the after-tax total
instantaneous expected return on asset j for investor i for i 6= j and µj the after-tax total instantaneous
expected return on the same asset for country j investors. Hence adopting the point of view of the
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domestic investor, stock prices have to be such that:
dSH = [µHSH −DH ]dt+ SH (σH)
T dW
dSF = [µHF SF − (1− τF )DF ]dt+ SF
¡
σHF
¢T dW
But stock prices also have to be solution of the following stochastic diﬀerential equations:
dSH = [µFHSH − (1− τH)DH ]dt+ SH
¡
σFH
¢T dW
dSF = [µFSF −DF ]dt+ SF (σF )
T dW
Since investors have to agree on a same price, the following conditions must hold9 :
µH − µFH = τH
DH
SH
µF − µHF = τF
DF
SF
(2)
σH = σFH σHF = σF
We assume that the equilibrium price dynamics are such that markets are complete (the two assets
are not redundant) and that no-arbitrage prevails, so that we can construct a well-defined after-tax state
price density process for each investor. We will note ξi (i = H,F ) each investor-specific after-tax state-
price density process. In complete markets, we know that, for given asset prices dynamics, ξi satisfies the
following stochastic diﬀerential equation10 :
dξi = −ξi[r(t)dt+ θ
T
i (t)dW(t)]
where θi represents investor i’s “after-tax” market prices of risk:
θi
(2,1)
≡
¡
σT
¢−1
[µi − r]
(2,2) (2,1)
, i = H,F
with µTH ≡ (µH , µHF ), µTF ≡ (µFH , µF ) and σ ≡
µ
σH σF
¶
≡


σH1 σF1
σH2 σF2

.
Because of (2), the diﬀerence between the investor-specific after-tax market prices of risk is given by:
θH − θF
(2,1)
=
¡
σT
¢−1
[µH − µF ] =
¡
σT
¢−1


µH − µFH
µHF − µF

 =
¡
σT
¢−1


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF


9 We assume that for τ low enough, the presence of no-short sale constraints does not aﬀect our analysis.
10 If we define ςi(t) = exp
h
−
R t
0 θ
0
i(s)dWs − 12
R t
0 θi(s).θi(s)ds
i
, we have ξi(t) =
ςi(t)
B(t) .
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2.3 Individual consumption-portfolio choice problem
Investor i is endowed with an initial share α0ij of stock j and with a tax redistribution process ei from
the government in units of consumption good. We suppose that each investor receives the taxes paid by
the other investor :
eH = τHαFHDH eF = τFαHFDF .
Taking prices and the tax redistribution process as given, investor i chooses a consumption process ci
and a portfolio process αi = (αiH , αiF ) in number of stocks shares. For a policy (ci,αi) to be admissible,
it must be such that the associated financial wealth Xi, which follows
dXi = Xirdt+ (ei − ci)dt+ αTi
(1,2)
IS
(2,2)
[(µi − r
(2,1)
)dt+ σT
(2,2)
dW
(2,1)
] (3)
satisfies the standard transversality condition (with IS a diagonal matrix that has SH and SF as coeﬃ-
cients).
The problem facing each investor is to maximize his expected utility over all admissible policies. Since
Cox and Huang [1989], it has been well known that this dynamic problem can be transformed into a static
variational problem through the use of the underlying state-price density. Hence, each investor’s problem
can be stated equivalently as follows:
max
ci
E
·Z +∞
0
e−ρt log(cit)dt
¸
E
·Z +∞
0
ξi(t)ci(t)dt
¸
≤ ξi(0)
¡
α0i
¢T
S(0)
(1,2) (2,1)
+E
·Z +∞
0
ξi(t)ei(t)dt
¸
i = H,F
In this formulation, each individual directly chooses his contingent consumption plans under a unique
budget constraint featuring state prices. The first-order condition of this problem is:
e−ρt
1
ci(t)
= Ψiξi(t) ∀t (4)
where Ψi, the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint, is such that
E
·Z +∞
0
ξi(t)
e−ρt
Ψiξi(t)
dt
¸
= ξi(0)
¡
α0i
¢T
S(0) +E
·Z +∞
0
ξi(t)ei(t)dt
¸
.
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2.4 Equilibrium and optimality
Given preferences, initial endowments and our tax reallocation rule, an equilibrium is an admissible price
system in the sense of section 2.2 and two admissible individual policies (ci,αi) such that each policy is
a solution of the corresponding investor’s optimization problem, and all markets clear at all dates, i.e.
for all t ≥ 0:
— market for good
cH(t) + cF (t) = DH(t) +DF (t) = D(t)
— equity markets
αH(t) +αF (t) = 1
(2,1)
— aggregate demand for the riskless bond is zero, a condition which (given market clearing on equity
markets) we can rewrite:
XH(t) +XF (t) = SH(t) + SF (t).
At equilibrium, the ratio of investors marginal utilities is not constant. Indeed, it is immediate from
(4) that
cF (t)
cH(t)
=
ΨHξH(t)
ΨF ξF (t)
Were taxes absent, the two investors would face the same state prices, and their consumption share
would be constant, a case of perfect risk-sharing. But because of taxes, the two investors do not face the
same state prices and the ratio ξH/ξF is not constant, making the ratio of investors marginal utilities
stochastic. In other words, because of diﬀerential taxation the equilibrium allocation is not Pareto-optimal :
the distortion induced by taxes implies a deviation from the first-best allocation. In this context, it will
be useful to introduce a stochastic Pareto-Negishi weight — in the spirit of Cuoco and He [1994]11 . This
stochastic weight, noted λ(t), plays a key role in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: if an equilibrium (c∗H , c∗F ) exists, there exists a process λ such that
— consumption allocations are given by
c∗H(t) =
1
1 + λ(t)
D(t) c∗F (t) =
λ(t)
1 + λ(t)
D(t)
11 Cuoco and He introduced a representative agent with state dependent utility in an incomplete market setting. Our
problem is simpler that theirs in this respect, since we do not have to solve for each investor’s minimax state-price density.
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— stock prices are
SH(t) =
D(t)
1 + λ(t)
Et
·Z +∞
t
e−ρ(s−t) [1 + λ(s)] DH(s)
D(s)
ds
¸
(5)
SF (t) =
λ(t)D(t)
1 + λ(t)
Et
·Z +∞
t
e−ρ(s−t) 1 + λ(s)
λ(s)
DF (s)
D(s)
ds
¸
(6)
Besides, the dynamic of λ verifies:
dλ
λ
= (θF − θH)T [θF dt+ dW] (7)
=
·
−τH
DH
SH
τF
DF
SF
¸
(1,2)
σ−1θF
(2,2)(2,1)
dt+
·
−τH
DH
SH
τF
DF
SF
¸
(1,2)
σ−1dW
(2,2)(2,1)
with λ(0) such that each investor’s constraint is respected. We only need to write one budget constraint,
e.g.
1
ρ
= E0
Z +∞
0
e−ρs
·
α0HH (1 + λ(s))
DH(s)
D(s)
+ λ(0)α0HF
1 + λ(s)
λ(s)
DF (s)
D(s)
+ (1 + λ(s)) eH(s)
D(s)
¸
ds (8)
Proposition 1 states that the equilibrium is entirely characterized by the evolution of one variable
which determines the weight of each agent in consumption allocation. At time t, λ(t) represents the ratio
of consumption cF (t)/cH(t). The higher λ the higher the share of total endowment D going to country
F . The initial value of λ, λ(0), is determined by the relative wealth of each country in expected present
value. Then the evolution of λ depends on the evolution of the relative wealth, which itself depends on
asset prices dynamics and diﬀerences of portfolio composition from one country to the other. Once λ is
plugged in the pricing kernel, asset prices can be expressed like in (5). λ will turn out to be an important
state variable. Indeed, when λ tends to infinity (respectively to 0), prices tend to those that would prevail
were there only foreign (resp. home) investors.
Converse of proposition 1: for λ(t) a given stochastic process, define stock price processes and
consumption allocations as in the previous proposition. If dynamics of λ are coherent with (7) and if the
budget constraint (8) holds, then λ supports an equilibrium.
2.5 Some equilibrium relationships
In this section, we give necessary conditions that must hold at equilibrium. These enable us to express
some key equilibrium variables, such as expected excess returns or the riskless rate, as functions of other
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endogenous variables, such as price-dividend yields, the asset prices diﬀusion coeﬃcients, or the coeﬃcient
governing the evolution of the consumption ratio (λ).
2.5.1 Expected excess returns
In order to derive the implications of diﬀerential taxation for expected excess returns, we first need to
derive investor-specific market prices of risk.
Lemma 1: The after-tax market prices of risk, as perceived by home and foreign investors, are
respectively given by
θH = σD +
λ(t)
1 + λ(t)
¡
σT
¢−1


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF


θF = σD −
1
1 + λ(t)
¡
σT
¢−1


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF


Using the result of lemma 1 and the definition of θi (such that µi − r = σTθi), proposition 2
characterizing excess returns immediately follows.
Proposition 2: the after-tax expected excess returns, respectively for investors in country H and in
country F, are given by:
µH − r = σTσD +
λ(t)
1 + λ(t)


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF


µF − r = σTσD −
1
1 + λ(t)


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF


Proposition 2 is a modified version of the continuous-time consumption-based CAPM. With logarith-
mic utility, in the benchmark case without taxes, we would get the vector of expected excess returns
for the two assets given by σTσD: the risk premia are equal to the covariance of asset returns with
aggregate consumption growth. The presence of taxes obviously lowers the after-tax risk premium on
foreign assets for domestic investors. The before-tax risk premia are given by the upper element of µH−r
and by the lower element of µF − r. Both are above their level in the benchmark case without taxes.
This is because both assets are partly held by taxed investors who require a higher pre-tax excess return
to compensate for taxation. The terms in τ that appear in proposition 2 are interacted with dividend
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yields. This suggests a potential way of testing our international version of the CCAPM, by testing for
the significance of this term in the pricing equation.
2.5.2 Portfolio shares
Portfolio shares are given by :


SHαHH
XH
SFαHF
XH

 = σ
−1θH + ²H = σ−1σD +
λ(t)
1 + λ(t)
¡
σTσ
¢−1


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF

+ ²H


SHαFH
XF
SFαFF
XF

 = σ
−1θF + ²F = σ−1σD −
1
1 + λ(t)
¡
σTσ
¢−1


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF

+ ²F
On each line, the first term σ−1θi=
¡
σTσ
¢−1
[µi − r] is the standard portfolio composition of a
logarithmic investor in complete markets. We see that for an investor in country H, τF reduces the
demand for foreign stocks by reducing after-tax expected returns on these stocks. Symmetrically, due to
market clearing, τH increases the domestic demand for domestic shares.
The second term ²i comes from the redistribution of taxes: for instance, since taxes redistributed to
investor H are proportionnal to DH , this will create a demand for foreign shares in order to hedge this
additionnal risk on domestic output, which shows up in ²H . However, we do not want to insist on this
additionnal term since it will be quantitatively small under reasonable assumptions12 .
2.5.3 The riskless rate
Proposition 3:
r = ρ+ µD − σD.σD −
λ
(1 + λ)2
σλ.σλ
= ρ+ µD − σD.σD −
λ
(1 + λ)2
·
τH
DH
SH
− τF
DF
SF
¸
(σTσ)−1


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF


where σD.σD ≡ σTDσD. In the fully integrated case (τ = 0), we get the standard interest rate formula:
with logarithmic utility, when perfect risk-sharing prevails, the interest rate is determined by the rate of
time preference, the average growth rate of aggregate consumption and its volatility. Once the endogenous
12 The way taxes are redistributed is a bit arbitrary anyway. It can be proved that there exists a redistribution scheme
such that ²H = 0.
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variables are determined (in section 3), we will be able to see how exactly the riskless rate is aﬀected by an
increase in τ . For now, since (σTσ)−1 is definite positive, we can just say that the interest rate is below
its level of perfect integration. This is to be interpreted as an eﬀect of higher savings for precautionary
motive, due to the fact that because of taxes investors hold less diversified portfolios and have greature
exposure to their domestic risk.
2.6 Complete characterization of a markovian equilibrium
Assuming that there exists a markovian equilibrium, i.e. an equilibrium with (D, δ, λ) jointly markov,
we will now characterize it and show how to construct it.
Lemma 2: we can write
SH(t) = SH(D(t), δ(t), λ(t)) =
D(t)
1 + λ(t)
h(δ(t), λ(t))
SF (t) = SF (D(t), δ(t), λ(t)) =
λ(t)D(t)
1 + λ(t)
f(δ(t), λ(t))
with
h(δ(t), λ(t)) ≡ E
·Z +∞
t
e−ρ(s−t) [1 + λ(s)] δ(s)ds |δ(t), λ(t)
¸
f(δ(t), λ(t)) ≡ E
·Z +∞
t
e−ρ(s−t) 1 + λ(s)
λ(s)
(1− δ(s))ds |δ(t), λ(t)
¸
Proof: on each line, the first equality follows from the markov assumption and the second equality
follows from the stock prices formulas in proposition 1 and from the definition of functions h and f .
Proposition 4: the functions h and f are solutions of the following PDEs
ρh = (1 + λ) δ + δµδhδ + λµλhλ +
1
2
δ2(σδ.σδ)hδδ +
1
2
λ2(σλ.σλ)hλλ + δλ(σδ.σλ)hδλ (9)
ρf = 1 + λ
λ
(1− δ) + δµδfδ + λµλfλ +
1
2
δ2(σδ.σδ)fδδ +
1
2
λ2(σλ.σλ)fλλ + δλ(σδ.σλ)fδλ (10)
with :
µδ ≡ (1− δ)
£
µDH − µDF − δσ
T
DHσDH + (1− δ)σ
T
DFσDF + (2δ − 1)σ
T
DHσDF
¤
σδ ≡ (1− δ)(σDH − σDF )
so that dδ = δµδdt+ δσTδ dW and
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µλ ≡ [−τH DHSH τF
DF
SF ]σ
−1σD + 11+λ(t) [−τH
DH
SH τF
DF
SF ]
¡
σTσ
¢−1


−τH DHSH
τF DFSF


σλ ≡
¡
σT
¢−1


−τH DHSH
τF DFSF

, so that dλ = λµλdt+ λσTλdW .
Proof: Apply the Feynmac-Kac formula to h and f to get the PDEs and apply Ito’s lemma to δ to
derive µδ and σδ.
Besides, the diﬀusion matrix for stock prices σ has to be coherent with functions h and f . This is
what the following proposition states.
Proposition 5 (restriction on σH and σF ):
hσH = hσD + λ
µ
hλ −
h
1 + λ
¶
σλ + δhδσδ (11)
fσF = fσD + λ
µ
fλ +
f
λ(1 + λ)
¶
σλ + δfδσδ (12)
In order to solve for equilibrium for any τ , we would have to solve a quadratic equation in σ (based on
equations (11) and (12)) and express its four coeﬃcients as functions of h, f and their partial derivatives.
Then we would able to reexpress µλ and σλ in (9) and (10) and get a non linear system of PDEs in h and
f . But even numerically, we doubt that the solution of this system would be easily tractable. In order
to save on computational diﬃculties and also to preserve closed-form expressions, we will rather consider
the case where τH = τF = τ is close to zero. This will enable us to give an approximation of equilibrium
in the neighborhood of the case of perfect integration by solving simple ODEs.
3 Results
Cochrane, Longstaﬀ and Santa-Clara [2003] have completely solved for equilibrium in the case with
no dividend taxation, with closed-form solutions for asset prices. They give two functions yH and yF
(reproduced in the appendix) such that
SH(t) = SH(D(t), δ(t)) = D(t)yH(δ(t))
SF (t) = SF (D(t), δ(t)) = D(t)yF (δ(t))
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In what follows, we derive Taylor expansions around this case of perfect risk-sharing and give approximate
closed-form expressions for asset prices, returns joint dynamics and equity portfolios for τH = τF = τ
close to zero. All symbols with subscript 0 will refer to the case studied in Cochrane et al. where τ = 0.
3.1 Asset prices
Proposition 6: To a first order, SH and SF are given by :
SH(Dt, δt, λt; τ) = Dt
·
1− τ λt
1 + λt
¸
yH(δt) + o(τ)
SF (Dt, δt, λt; τ) = Dt
·
1− τ 1
1 + λt
¸
yF (δt) + o(τ)
The first-order eﬀect of imperfect market integration is to reduce equilibrium asset prices: frictions
on financial markets translate into lower prices by reducing expecting income streams on domestic shares
received by foreigners. Note that the decrease in domestic asset prices is higher when λ is higher: this
makes sense since λ measures the relative influence of foreign investors in the pricing of assets (the higher
λ the richer the foreign investors relative to the domestic ones). The relative wealth of both countries
matters for asset prices: when countries are similar in other respects, asset prices of country H are lower
if country H is the poorest (λ > 1) since foreigners have a higher influence in the pricing of assets and
they are willing to pay a lower price.
Proposition 7: To a second order, SH and SF are given by
SH(t) = Dt
"
yH(δ)
Ã
1− τ λ
1 + λ
+ τ2
λ
(1 + λ)2
!
+ τ2
λ
(1 + λ)2
h2(δ)
#
+ o(τ2)
SF (t) = Dt
·
yF (δ)
µ
1− τ 1
1 + λt
+ τ2 λ
(1 + λ)2
¶
+ τ2 λ
(1 + λ)2
f2(δ)
¸
+ o(τ2)
where h2(δ) and f2(δ) are solutions of the following ODE
ρh2 − δµδh02 −
1
2
δ2σTδ σδh002 = (Ω0.Ω0)yH
ρf2 − δµδf 02 −
1
2
δ2(σTδ σδ)f 002 = (Ω0.Ω0) yF
with boundary conditions :



h2(0) = 0
h2(1) = 1ρ2Ω0(1).Ω0(1)


f2(0) = 1ρ2Ω0(0).Ω0(0)
f2(1) = 0
15
and
Ω0(δ) ≡ (σT0 )−1


−
³
DH
SH
´
0³
DF
SF
´
0


Making sense of the second order price eﬀects of integration requires to understand its impacts on the
riskless rate and on the variance-covariance matrix of returns. We will see below that to a second order,
the riskless rate and the return correlation decrease, both eﬀects having a positive impact on asset prices
through the risk-adjusted discount factor.
3.2 Instantaneous volatility and correlation
Using h2 and f2 solutions of the ODEs above, we get the second-order expansion of σH and σF . A
conspicuous feature of these expressions is the absence of first order impact of taxes on returns second-
order moments.
Proposition 8:
σH = σH0 + τ2
λ
(1 + λ)2
½
−Ω0 +
·
h02
yH
− λy
0
H
yH
− h2y
0
H
(yH)2
¸
δσδ
¾
+ o(τ2) (13)
σF = σF0 + τ2
λ
(1 + λ)2
½
Ω0 +
·
f 02
yF
− 1
λ
y0F
yF
− f2y
0
F
(yF )2
¸
δσδ
¾
+ o(τ2) (14)
Before illustrating these formulas, we will briefly describe our baseline calibration choice. We take
the following parameters: ρ = 0.04, µDH = µDF = 0.025, σDH ,1 = 0.145, σDH ,2 = 0.039, σDF ,1 = 0.039
and σDF ,2 = 0.14513 . This calibration matches the US stock market data: on an annual basis, the
S&P500 volatility after World War II is 0.15 and the dividend yield is around 0.04 (and is equal to ρ
is the symmetric case of perfect integration). Our fundamental correlation η is equal to 0.5, which is
consistent with the empirical stock returns correlation of 0.58 between the US and a non-US synthetic
world index over the period 1980-200014 . τ is a free parameter the impact of which we are interested
in. Gordon and Hines [2002] provide some useful information on international taxation. First, domestic
investors pay withholding taxes when repatriating foreign dividends. These taxes depend on the foreign
countries considered but are typically around 10%15 . Second, investors can claim tax rebate on domestic
13 This corresponds to σD = 0.15 and to a fundamental correlation η = 0.5. This calibration allow us to match the
moments of stock returns in the US at the expense of the moments observed for the fundamentals. It is well known that
the volatility of stock markets is much higher than the volatility of GDP.
14 The empirical stock returns correlation is calculated using monthly returns of both indexes in US$.
15 Investors can claim foreign tax credits in some countries but anyway those credits are subject to ceiling limits and do
not apply to tax-exempt investment plans (like retirement plans).
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investment to avoid the double-taxation of profits (since profits are already subject to the corporate tax)
whereas such tax rebate is not available on foreign assets, driving a wedge in the taxation of both assets.
At the bottom line, it seems that reasonable values for τ are between 10% and 15%16 .
Figure 1 below illustrates the impact of τ on asset volatility in a perfectly symmetric case. From (13)
and (14), we can also compute the instantaneous correlation between returns and see how it is aﬀected by
τ . As shown in figure 2, we find that the correlation monotonously decreases with τ . To understand the
impact of the degree of market integration on the equilibrium correlation of returns, we can first consider
the case of perfect integration, as opposed to the case of full segmentation. When markets are fully
segmented, a good shock on the dividends of an asset in one country has no impact on the price of assets
in another country. But it is diﬀerent when investors can hold assets everywhere without any obstacle.
The reason is that following the rise in the domestic price due to the good domestic shock, the share of
asset H in the “world market portfolio” automatically increases, making country F asset more appealling
because the diversification opportunities it oﬀers are suddenly more cherished. The required excess return
on asset F decreases and its price increases to restore equilibrium on the asset market17 . When τ > 0,
the same sort of mechanism is at work but attenuated due to investors heterogeneity. Indeed, a good
DH aﬀects diﬀerently both investors (who share risk imperfectly): the home investor is the most aﬀected
since his portfolio is biased towards home assets — and he is reluctant to rebalance his portfolio towards
foreign assets. This attenuates the increase in SF compared to the case of perfect risk-sharing. Then,
when cross-border impediments to foreign equity holdings are relaxed, we should observe a higher level
of stock returns correlations between countries: this is consistent with the empirical findings of Bekaert
and Harvey [2000] who showed that equity market liberalization increases stock markets comovement of
countries with the rest of the world for a sample of emerging economies.
16 For the US, the relevant withholding tax is 15% with European countries and Japan.
17 And the increase of SH is also lower than under full segmentation. This reasoning holds when the market shares of H
is not “too small” to start with.
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Figure 1: Stock returns volatility in the symmetric case as a function of τ . (Calibration : ρ = 0.04,
µDH = µDF = 0.025, σDH ,1 = σDF ,2 = 0.145, σDH ,2 = σDF ,1 = 0.039).
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Figure 2: Stock returns correlation in the symmetric case as a function of τ . (Calibration : ρ = 0.04,
µDH = µDF = 0.025, σDH ,1 = σDF ,2 = 0.145, σDH ,2 = σDF ,1 = 0.039).
Table 1 shows the magnitude of this eﬀect conditional on three structural parameters: the degree of
market integration (inversely related to τ), the level of fundamental correlation η and the rate of time
preference ρ. We see that for given η and ρ, the correlation of asset returns is always monotonously
decreasing in τ , consistently with figure 2. It should be noticed that for a higher level of fundamental
correlation, the equilibrium correlation of asset returns ηS is closer to its fundamental value η, meaning
that endogenous comovements of asset prices are less important: when the fundamental correlation
is higher, high dividends in one country are often accompanied by high dividends in the other country,
reducing the incentives to rebalance the portfolio. Finally, we find that the impact of financial integration
on the equilibrium returns correlation is much higher when the rate of time preference is low. The intuition
for this eﬀect is not obvious — except for the fact that in the limit case of complete myopia, the optimal
portfolio rebalancing behaviour that induces endogenous comovements of asset prices no longer exists.
18
ηS
ρ = 0.1 ρ = 0.05 ρ = 0.01
τ = 0 0.087 0.150 0.394
η = 0 τ = 5% 0.080 0.144 0.393
τ = 10% 0.060 0.131 0.389
τ = 0 0.315 0.360 0.543
η = 0.25 τ = 5% 0.307 0.355 0.541
τ = 10% 0.284 0.342 0.537
τ = 0 0.539 0.566 0.680
η = 0.5 τ = 5% 0.530 0.560 0.678
τ = 10% 0.504 0.546 0.674
Table 1 : Stock return correlation ηS as a function of the fundamental correlation η and obstacles to
international investment τ (for a given volatility of fundamentals σD = 0, 15)
3.3 Portfolio composition
To a first order, portfolio shares are given by :


SHαHH
XH
SFαHF
XH

 = σ
−1
0 σD + τ
λ
1 + λ
¡
σT0 σ0
¢−1


DH
SH
−DFSF

+ ²H + o(τ) (15)


SHαFH
XF
SFαFF
XF

 = σ
−1
0 σD + τ
1
1 + λ
¡
σT0 σ0
¢−1


−DHSH
DF
SF

+ ²F + o(τ) (16)
Proof : Immediate using section 2.5.2 and
¡
σT
¢−1
=
¡
σT0
¢−1
+ o(τ).
In the appendix, we show that to a first order ²TH = τλ(SHSF /(SH+SF )2)[−1 1]. The redistribution
of taxes generates some "foreign bias" in portfolios since redistributed endowments create an additionnal
exposition towards domestic dividends and make foreign assets attractive to hegde that risk. However,
since this term is found to be quantitatively small when the two countries are not too asymmetric and
since it depends very much on the assumed system of redistribution, we will neglect it from now on but
none of the following results rely on this approximation.
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Portfolio shares can easily be interpreted as deviations from the world market portfolio. Introducing
the following notations for the elements of the instantaneous variance-covariance matrix for stock prices,
σTσ =


σ2SH
ηSσSHσSF
ηSσSHσSF
σ2SF

, we can rewrite (15) and (16) as follows:
SHαHH
XH
= ρyH(δ)
µ
1 + τ ηS
1− η2S
λ
1 + λ
1
σSHσSF
1
ΦH
DF
SF
+
τ
1− η2S
λ
1 + λ
1
σ2SH
1
ΦH
DH
SH
¶
SFαHF
XH
= ρyF (δ)
µ
1− τ
1− η2S
λ
1 + λ
1
σ2SF
1
ΦF
DF
SF
− τ ηS
1− η2S
λ
1 + λ
1
σSHσSF
1
ΦF
DH
SH
¶
where Φj ≡ SjSH+SF . When τ = 0,
SHαHH
XH (resp.
SFαHF
XH ) is simply ρyH(δ), which is equal to
SH
SH+SF (resp.
ρyF (δ) = SFSH+SF ): without frictions in financial markets, since there is no heterogeneity among investors,
the portfolio composition of a home investor is exactly the world market portfolio, which contains a
share SHSH+SF of domestic assets (resp. a share
SF
SH+SF of foreign assets). The existence of frictions on
international financial markets generates deviations from this benchmark case. As already mentionned
in section 2.5.2, taxes on foreign assets directly reduce foreign asset holdings of domestic investors and
make them rebalance their portfolio towards domestic assets — and symmetrically, as the tax reduces the
demand of domestic shares by foreigners, this generates an additionnal bias towards domestic shares for
domestic investors (which accounts for the presence of two terms in τ). The size of the bias in portfolios is
proportional to 1
1−η2S
, where ηS denotes the correlation between assets: when assets are close substitutes
(high ηS), the eﬀect of the friction on equity holdings is amplified.
Some comparative statics in a simple symmetric case
In the symmetric case where τF = τH = τ , σSH = σSF = σS , µDH = µDF and δ =
1
2 , we get :
EqHH
XH
=
1
2
+ τ λ
1 + λ
ρ
σ2S(1− ηS)
EqHF
XH
=
1
2
− τ λ
1 + λ
ρ
σ2S(1− ηS)
where Eqij denotes equity holdings (at market value) of country i in country j. Simple comparative
statics tell us that when assets are closer substitutes (higher ηS), as foreign assets oﬀer less diversification
opportunities, foreign asset holdings decrease (and domestic asset holdings increase)18
∂EqHF
∂ηS
= −∂EqHH
∂ηS
= −τ λ
1 + λ
ρ
σ2S(1− ηS)2
XH < 0,
and the impact of τ is magnified: ∂EqHF∂ηS = −
λ
1+λ
ρ
σ2S(1−ηS)
XH < 0 and
¯¯¯
∂EqHF
∂∂τ
¯¯¯
is increasing in ηS .
18 Notice that the correlation has no impact on portfolio composition if τ = 0.
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These eﬀects are shown in figure 3 for λ = 1, ρ = 0.04 and σD = 0.15, for three diﬀerent values of
τ (0, 8% and 15%). We see that under reasonable friction (τ = 15%) and reasonable return correlation
(ηS = 0.5), we are able to generate substantial deviations from the world market portfolio (which has an
equal share in domestic and foreign assets).
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 return correlation
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
EqHFcccccccccccccXH
Figure 3: Share of domestic wealth invested abroad in the symmetric case as a function of stock return
correlation, for various τ (Calibration : ρ = 0.04, µDH = µDF = 0.025, σH = σF = 0.146).
When investments are riskier (higher σS), holdings of foreign assets increase as the motive for risk-
sharing increases:
∂EqHF
∂σ2S
= −∂EqHH
∂σ2S
= τ
λ
1 + λ
ρ
σ4S(1− ηS)
XH > 0
Finally, our model predicts that the “home bias” in portfolios should be larger in countries whose relative
wealth (captured by λ) is smaller, a prediction consistent with the evidence in Chan et al. [2004]19 . The
higher λ, the larger the negative impact of the friction on the price of the domestic asset (because of
the increased influence of foreigners in the pricing of the domestic asset) and the larger the incentive for
domestic investors to buy their home asset. In the symmetric case, we have :
∂EqHH
∂λ
= −∂EqHF
∂λ
= τ 1
(1 + λ)2
ρ
σ2(1− ηS)2
XH > 0
19 The lowest three values taken by their measure of home bias (computed as deviation from the world market portfolio)
are for the three largest markets (namely US, UK and Japan) and the largest four are for New Zealand, Norway, Portugal
and Greece.
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3.4 A gravity equation for bilateral equity holdings
Our model gives theoretical foundations to gravity equations on bilateral equity holdings. Indeed, when
we turn from portfolio shares to the value of equity holdings, we have :
log(EqHF ) ≡ log(SFαHF ) = logXH + log (ρyF (δ))− τ
1
1− η2S
λ
1 + λ
1
σFΦF
µ
1
σF
DF
SF
+ ηS
1
σH
DH
SH
¶
where logXH and log(ρyF (δ)) are the mass terms in the gravity equation20 .
As shown by Portes and Rey [2005], gravity equations perform well in describing international asset
allocation. In their setup, they use the market capitalizations of origin and destination countries as proxies
for the mass terms of the equation. Our model clarifies which variables should be used: for the origin
country, one should use the aggregate wealth (XH) of the country21 and market capitalization might be
an imperfect proxy of it, whereas for the destination country, the market capitalization is certainly more
appropriate as a proxy for the present value of current and future foreign dividend streams (ρyF (δ)).
Moreover, Portes and Rey [2005] propose to interact variables of financial frictions between countries
with the degree of substituability between assets (measured here by 1/
¡
1− η2S
¢
). Our model provides
theoretical foundations to such a procedure.
3.5 The riskless rate
The second-order approximation of the riskless rate is given by :
r = ρ+ µD − σTDσD − τ2
λ
(1 + λ)2
ΩT0Ω0 + o(τ2)
= ρ+ µD − σTDσD − τ2
λ
(1 + λ)2
·
DH
SH
− DF
SF
¸ ¡
σTσ
¢−1


DH
SH
−DFSF

+ o(τ
2)
When markets are imperfectly integrated, the interest rate is below its level of perfect integration: as
we already mentionned above, this is due to higher savings for precautionary motive (see figure (4)).
20 In this expression, yF (δ) = Et
£R∞
t e
−ρ(s−t) (1− δ(s)) ds
¤
is the present value of current and future contribution of
country F in world production.
21 This variable is unfortunately often unobservable: this justifies the use of origin country fixed-eﬀects as in Aviat and
Coeurdacier [2004].
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3.6 Excess returns
To a second order, required excess returns for assets H and F are respectively :
µH − r = σH(τ).σD + τ
λ
1 + λ
DH
SH(τ)
+ o(τ2)
µF − r = σF (τ).σD +
τ
1 + λ
DF
SF (τ)
+ o(τ2)
Since risk-sharing increases as τ decreases, the required excess return also decreases, as we show below
(for the same set of parameters as above).
Our finding that an increase in financial markets integration (a decrease in τ) reduces the required
excess return is consistent with the empirical evidence (Bekaert et al. [2000] and Henry [2000]). Moreover,
we have two additionnal second-order eﬀects on the risk premium (coming through asset prices levels and
asset returns volatilities) going in opposite directions. First, since asset prices are lower under imperfect
integration, this amplifies the eﬀect of taxes on the risk premium by increasing the after-tax return on
home assets required by the foreigners. Second, the decrease in the correlation of stock returns with
aggregate output drives the risk premium down.
3.7 The cost of capital
We saw that a decrease in τ causes both an increase in the riskless rate and a decrease in the equilibrium
excess returns. The overall impact of a change in τ on the cost of capital is non monotonous, as shown
in figure (6).
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Figure 4 : Riskless rate in the symmetric case as a function of τ . (Calibration : ρ = 0.04,
µDH = µDF = 0.025, σDH ,1 = σDF ,2 = 0.145, σDH ,2 = σDF ,1 = 0.039).
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14
tau0.017
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Figure 5 : Excess returns in the symmetric case as a function of τ . (Calibration : ρ = 0.04,
µDH = µDF = 0.025, σDH ,1 = σDF ,2 = 0.145, σDH ,2 = σDF ,1 = 0.039).
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Figure 6 : Cost of capital in the symmetric case as a function of τ . (Calibration : ρ = 0.04,
µDH = µDF = 0.025, σDH ,1 = σDF ,2 = 0.145, σDH ,2 = σDF ,1 = 0.039).
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4 Comments and discussions
4.1 Beyond logarithmic utility
It could be argued that, assuming log utility, we tackle the case most favorable to getting home bias.
But as is well known, assuming power utility with relative risk aversion higher than one would have two
eﬀects. For given ηS , a higher risk aversion implies more willingness to diversify, thus reducing home bias.
But at the same time, decreasing the elasticity of intertemporal substitution would amplify the impact of
endowment shocks on asset prices, thus increasing ηS for given η. Indeed, a good dividend shock implies a
current increase in consumption and for this increase in consumption to be "accepted" by intertemporally
maximizing agents, the interest rate and expected returns must adjust in such a way that increasing
consumption now (rather than saving for the future) becomes optimal. This means that expected returns
must decrease, which happens through a price increase. The required asset price adjustment is the larger
the lower the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Dumas, Harvey and Ruiz [2002] point to this
elasticity as the key preference parameter driving stock return correlations. Overall, assuming power
utility with relative risk aversion higher than one would certainly increase return correlations, which
would dampen the direct eﬀect of higher risk aversion on the extent of portfolio diversification. The two
eﬀects could be disentangled by introducing Epstein-Zin preferences.
4.2 Imperfect substituability between home and foreign goods
International asset pricing models typically restrict the commodity market to a single tradable good22 ,
and our model is no exception. In other words, it is assumed that home and foreign goods are perfect
substitutes. Relaxing this assumption would not change the overall message of our paper, but it would
lead to a new component driving asset prices correlations: a “terms of trade eﬀect” (this eﬀect appears
in Rigobon and Pavlova [2004], for an elasticity equal to one).
Indeed, assuming perfect goods substituability and no frictions on the international goods markets
implies that the terms of trade and the real exchange rate must be constant and equal to one. But as
soon as goods produced at home and abroad are imperfect substitutes, the relative price of domestic and
22 Of course, the strand of the literature (following Dellas and Stockman [1989]) that adopts the dichotomy between
traded and non-traded goods has more than one good, but still typically has only one type of traded good. The real
exchange rate in these models is not constant, but the eﬀect that we have in mind in this section does not show up in these
models.
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foreign goods is aﬀected by the relative scarcity of each type of goods: the relative price of a good is
negatively related to its abundance (this is a standard feature of Ricardian models of trade). This “terms
of trade eﬀect” would play in case of endowment shocks, a good dividend shock being accompanied by a
counteracting relative price change, which would make asset prices evolutions more connected.
The strength of this eﬀect decreases with goods substituability. For an elasticity of substitution
below one, the eﬀect is so large that a good shock in the home country reduces domestic asset prices
and increases foreign asset prices, leading actually to a divergence in returns! In the special case of an
elasticity of substitution equal to one (Cobb-Douglas preferences), the “terms of trade eﬀect” exactly
cancels out the initial eﬀect of the rise in profits on asset prices, making domestic and foreign assets
perfect substitutes. This is exactly what happens in Cole and Obstfeld [1991]: financial diversification
is pointless since perfect risk-sharing is achieved through terms of trade movements. In the frictionless
case, one can show that the substituability between assets (i.e. their returns correlation) is decreasing
with respect to the substituability between goods23 . In particular, this means that we would get the same
level of assets returns correlation for a level of fundamentals correlation lower than what we used in our
calibration. We leave a full characterization of the equilibrium with diﬀerentiated goods and frictions for
future research.
4.3 Financial frictions vs. trade cost
Can we interpret our tax on the repatriation of dividends as a trade cost, i.e. as a cost associated with
the shipping of goods? First, it is important to notice that if τ were to be interpreted as a shipping
cost, it could not be an iceberg cost, since our tax redistribution amounts to no transfer loss. But even
abstracting from the redistribution of taxes, a model with a tax on dividend repatriation and a model
with trade costs (Dumas [1992], Sercu [1993], Sercu, Uppal and Van Hulle [1995, 2002]) are not equivalent:
indeed, if domestic residents have to pay a trade cost τ when shipping goods from abroad, they can save
on these costs by exchanging the goods they own abroad against domestic goods owned by foreigners at
the equilibrium relative price, the real exchange rate: no shipping costs will be paid as long as foreign
and domestic productions are not too asymmetric (or equivalently as long as the real exchange rate is
23 This result holds for an elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods larger than one. A proof is available
on request.
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between 1− τ and 11−τ ). This is a key diﬀerence with our setup, in which investors have no other option
than repatriating their dividends and paying taxes.
A model with transportation costs could lead to an equilibrium closer to the one we get if an additional
friction was introduced in the goods market. Indeed, in Dumas [1992] and the papers that followed, the
goods market is perfectly competitive and agents are price-takers. We could relax this assumption and
say that domestic agents who own goods abroad (in quantity q) can either ship the goods by themselves,
with proportional costs T , or exchange them against home goods with a price-maker retailer at a relative
price 11−τ . As long as τ < T , the domestic resident will choose to sell his goods to the retailer, so that
the final quantity of home goods that he can consume from his claim on foreign output is (1 − τ)q . In
this modified setting with an imperfectly competitive goods market, agents always have to pay the trade
cost τ per unit of goods “shipped”24 , so that the equilibrium portfolios and asset prices would be in line
with those that we found above. Frictions on the goods markets would then be equivalent to frictions on
financial markets: in both cases, foreign dividend streams would be less valuable because associated with
systematically paid costs τ .
5 Conclusion
This paper provides a complete description of the competitive equilibrium prevailing in what we believe
to be a benchmark case of imperfectly integrated financial markets. We find our setting appealing as it
is all at once simple, empirically relevant and able of accounting for various dimensions of the data.
The technical challenge that we faced and overcame consists in solving for equilibrium with hetero-
geneous agents, the source of heterogeneity being that, due to diﬀerential taxation, investors do not face
the same opportunity set (after-tax dividend streams is what matters). In a partial equilibrium sense,
our markets are complete: each investor faces a number of independent assets equal to the martingale
multiplicity plus one, therefore we could use Cox and Huang [1989], rather than He and Pearson [1991],
to solve the individual consumption-portfolio choice problem. But in a general equilibrium sense, it is as
24 Note that τ is not completely unconnected to the eﬀective transport cost T since 1
1−T is the maximum relative price
that the retailer can charge. Moreover, we have not determined the optimal τ that retailers would charge but such a τ
exists since when τ is getting to high, either domestic residents just consume their own production or prefer shipping goods
by themselves, which drives profits to zero.
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though markets were incomplete. The departure from complete risk-sharing, which materializes in our
time-varying relative weight, comes precisely from the fact that due to diﬀerential taxation investors do
not face the same (after-tax ) assets. This is why we refer to Cuoco and He [1994], rather than resorting
to a representative agent like in Huang [1987].
In the end, our model is successful at making sense of many aspects of international financial markets
and their evolution25 . We capture the eﬀect of integration (understood as a decrease in τ) on asset
prices, we show how the CCAPM is modified relative to the fully-integrated case and how the impact of
integration on the cost of capital depends on the respective size of opposite eﬀects on the riskless rate and
on the risk premium. We got a second-order eﬀect of integration on return volatility and on the correlation
of returns, this eﬀect being due to the fact that impediments to cross-border equity holdings prevent
“portfolio rebalancing” and dampen comovements of the pricing kernels relevant for each asset. We shall
insist on the fact that our specification provides a lower bound on the ability of the model to generate
high return correlation. Higher return correlation could be obtained for given fundamental correlation
by decreasing the substituability between home and foreign goods and/or by decreasing the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. Whatever its strength, the relationship between return correlation and the
degree of financial integration that shows up in our model is a point relevant for any empirical work
looking at the impact of the correlation structure of asset returns on international portfolio allocation.
Since the integration of financial markets lead simultaneously to higher comovements of stock prices and
to higher levels of cross-border equity holdings, one should be very careful in interpreting the impact
of the correlation of stock returns on cross-border equity holdings without controlling for the degree of
integration between countries: it could create endogeneity issues which should be taken into account (for
instance, see Portes and Rey [2005], Coeurdacier and Guibaud [2004] and Chan et al. [2005]).
We believe our model is instrumental in understanding what “financial integration” means — and
in making sense of the paradox associated with its measurement. The paradox comes from the fact
that attempting to assess the degree of integration does not convey the same impression along every
dimensions: portfolio biases point to segmentation, whereas flows, after their dramatic increase, point to
25 As should be conspicuous, our assessment of the impacts of financial integration does not take into account many
imperfections that are of high relevance in the real world.
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a high degree of integration26 . And even though some arbitrage opportunities may still be found, assets
are priced internationally. These diﬀerent “sides” of world financial markets show up in our model.
Frictions on goods markets, in the form of trade costs, is another important characteristic of the real
world. We gave some insights on the link between our setup and asset pricing models featuring such
frictions (section 4.3). Having such frictions is important to get a realistic behavior of the terms of trade
and of the real exchange rate, and it certainly aﬀects portfolio choice, as originally shown in Adler and
Dumas [1983], since investors facing diﬀerent consumption price indices do not face the same real returns
distribution for a given menu of nominal assets. Frictions on financial markets and frictions on goods
markets are definitely related as emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [2000], though they are not totally
equivalent27 . We sketched how multiple frictions on the goods markets could generate the eﬀects on
portfolio composition and asset prices that we naturally obtain in our setup. More work is needed to
determine exactly the respective implications of frictions on financial markets and on goods markets and
how they do interact.
26 We have large flows of trade in assets (which we did not emphasize), because our friction is not a transaction cost.
27 In particular, Uppal [1993] and Sercu, Uppal and van Hulle [2002] show that, in the presence of positive but finite
iceberg costs (and a perfectly competitive goods market), portfolio holdings do not exhibit any home bias in the logarithmic
utility case, and even show reverse bias with power utility and risk aversion higher than one.
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6 Appendix
• Proof of proposition 1 (equilibrium as an optimum with stochastic weighting)
Take λ(t) = ΨHξH(t)ΨF ξF (t) .
FOC and market clearing for goods give the expressions for CH and CF as functions of D and λ.
The dynamics of λ directly follows from Ito’s lemma, since we know the processes for the ξi.
To derive the expression for SH , we used the fact that (by definition of the state price density)
ξH(t)SH(t) = Et
·Z +∞
t
ξH(s)DH(s)ds
¸
⇒ SH(t) =
1
ξH(t)
Et
·Z +∞
t
ξH(s)DH(s)ds
¸
Besides the FOC is
e−ρtu0(cH) = ΨHξH(t)
⇒ ξH(t) =
1
ΨH
e−ρtu0(cH) =
1
ΨH
e−ρt 1 + λ(t)
D(t)
Plugging this into the above expression for SH(t) and simplifying gives the expression in the text.
Idem for SF (t).
To get the expression for the domestic budget constraint, write
E
·Z +∞
0
ξH(t)
D(t)
1 + λ(t)
dt
¸
= ξH(0)α0HS(0) +E
·Z +∞
0
ξH(t)eH(t)dt
¸
⇒ E
·Z +∞
0
1
ΨH
e−ρtdt
¸
= ξH(0)α0HHSH(0) + ξH(0)α0HFSF (0) +E
·Z +∞
0
1
ΨH
e−ρt 1 + λ(t)
D(t)
eH(t)dt
¸
⇒
Z +∞
0
e−ρtdt = 1 + λ(0)
D(0)
½
α0HH
D(0)
1 + λ(0)
E
·Z +∞
0
e−ρs [1 + λ(s)] DH(s)
D(s)
ds
¸
+α0HF
λ(0)D(0)
1 + λ(0)
E
·Z +∞
0
e−ρs 1 + λ(s)
λ(s)
DF (s)
D(s)
ds
¸¾
+E
·Z +∞
0
e−ρt 1 + λ(t)
D(t)
eH(t)dt
¸
⇒
Z +∞
0
e−ρtdt = α0HHE
·Z +∞
0
e−ρs [1 + λ(s)]
DH(s)
D(s)
ds
¸
+ α0HFλ(0)E
·Z +∞
0
e−ρs
1 + λ(s)
λ(s)
DF (s)
D(s)
ds
¸
+E
·Z +∞
0
e−ρt 1 + λ(t)
D(t)
eH(t)dt
¸
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Finally, we get:
1
ρ
= E
½Z +∞
0
e−ρs
·
α0HH (1 + λ(s))
DH(s)
D(s)
+ λ(0)α0HF
1 + λ(s)
λ(s)
DF (s)
D(s)
+ (1 + λ(s)) eH(s)
D(s)
¸
ds
¾
where
eH(s) = τHαFH(s)DH(s)
Remark : when τH = τF = 0, ci(t) = ρXi(t).
In this case, λ = XFXH =
ΨHξH
ΨF ξF
is constant and equal to the wealth ratio.
• Proof of lemma 1 (market prices of risk)
The outline of the proof is the following: start from FOCs , apply Ito’s lemma to both terms and
identify diﬀusion terms, then use market clearing.
The first-order condition (shown in section 2.3) is:
e−ρt 1cH(t) = ΨHξH(t)
⇒ −ρe−ρt 1cH(t)dt− e
−ρt 1
cH(t)2 dcH + e
−ρt 1
cH(t)3 dc
2
H = −ΨHξH(t)[r(t)dt+ θ
T
H(t)dW(t)]
We will use the following notations
dCi = µCi()dt+ σ
T
Ci()dW i = H,F
Identifying diﬀusion terms implies:
−e−ρt 1cH(t)2σcH (t) = −ΨHξH(t)θH(t)
⇒ −e−ρt 1cH(t)2σcH (t) = −e
−ρt 1
cH(t)θH(t), using e
−ρt 1
cH(t) = ΨHξH(t)
⇒ σcH (t) = cH(t)θH(t)
In the same manner, we get σcF (t) = cF (t)θF (t)
Besides, market clearing implies
σCH () + σCF () = DσD = D [δ(t)σDH + (1− δ(t))σDF ] .
So cH(t)θH(t) + cF (t)θF (t) = [δ(t)σDH + (1− δ(t))σDF ]D.
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We can also use: θH − θF = (σT )−1


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF

 and substitute for θF to get:
cH(t)θH(t) + cF (t)θH − cF (t)(σT )−1


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF

 = D [δ(t)σDH + (1− δ(t))σDF ]
ie (using cFD =
λ
1+λ)
θH(t) = [δ(t)σDH + (1− δ(t))σDF ] +
λ(t)
1 + λ(t)
(σT )−1


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF


The formula for θF (t) follows from the formula for θH − θF .
Remark: the drift and diﬀusion in the dynamics of λ, dλλ = µλdt+ σTλdW, can be reexpressed:
σλ = θF − θH
(2,1)
=
¡
σT
¢−1


−τH DHSH
τF DFSF


µλ = (θF − θH)
T θF = [−τH
DH
SH
τF
DF
SF
]
h¡
σT
¢−1iT
| {z }
σTλ



σD +
1
1 + λ(t)
¡
σT
¢−1


−τH DHSH
τF DFSF


| {z }
θF



= σTλσD + 11+λ(t)σ
T
λσλ
= [−τH DHSH τF
DF
SF ]
h¡
σT
¢−1iT σD+ 11+λ(t) [−τH DHSH τF DFSF ] h¡σT¢−1iT ¡σT¢−1


−τH DHSH
τF DFSF


• Portfolio choice
We drop subscripts, as the expressions are valid for both investors
ξ(t)X(t) = Et
·Z ∞
t
ξ(s)(c(s)− e(s))ds
¸
X(t) = Et
·Z ∞
t
ξ(s)
ξ(t)
(c(s)− e(s))ds
¸
= Et
·Z ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t) c(t)
c(s)
(c(s)− e(s))ds
¸
= c(t)Et
·Z ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)
µ
1− e(s)
c(s)
¶
ds
¸
= c(t)
·
1
ρ
−Et
Z ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t) e(s)
c(s)
ds
¸
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Since eH = ταFHDH , we rewrite:
XH(t) = cH(t)
·
1
ρ
− τuH(t)
¸
=
1
ρ
D(t)
1 + λ(t)
[1− τρuH(t)]
Ito’s lemma implies that in dXH = µXHXHdt+XHσXHdW
σXH = σD −
λ
1 + λ
σλ + τσe
where σe depends on the endowment term uH .
Applying the martingale representation theorem like Cox and Huang [1989], we identify diﬀusion
terms in (3) and get the following expressions for the domestic home investor’s portfolios:


SHαHH
XH
SFαHF
XH

 = σ
−1σD −
λ
1 + λ
σ−1σλ + τσ−1σe
= σ−1σD +
λ
1 + λ
¡
σTσ
¢−1


DH
SH
−DFSF

+ ²H
= σ−1θH + ²H
• Proof of proposition 3 (riskless rate)
* Start from FOC, apply Ito and identify drift terms:
e−ρt 1cH(t) = ΨHξH(t)
⇒ −ρe−ρt 1cH(t)dt− e
−ρt 1
cH(t)2 dcH + e
−ρt 1
cH(t)3 dc
2
H = −ΨHξH(t)[r(t)dt+ θ
T
H(t)dW(t)] (Ito)
⇒ −ρ 1cH(t) −
1
cH(t)2µCH +
1
cH(t)3σ
T
cH (t)σcH (t) = −
1
cH(t)r(t) (identification of drift terms)
⇒ r(t) = ρ+ µCH (t)cH(t) −
1
cH(t)2σ
T
cH (t)σcH (t) = ρ+
µCH (t)
cH(t) − θ
T
H(t)θH(t)
where we used σcH = cHθH to get the last equation.
In the same way, we get: r(t) = ρ+ µCF (t)cF (t) −
1
cF (t)2σ
T
cF (t)σcF (t) = ρ+
µCF (t)
cF (t) − θ
T
F (t)θF (t)
* Summing the two expressions:
r(t) = ρ+
1
2
µ
µCH (t)
cH(t)
+
µCF (t)
cF (t)
¶
− 1
2
(θH(t).θH(t) + θF (t).θF (t))
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* Then using market clearing (which implies µCH () + µCF () = µDD) and applying Ito’s lemma on
D/(1 + λ) to get µCH , after a bit of algebra, the term
µCH (t)
cH(t) +
µCF (t)
cF (t) can be shown to be equal to
2µD +
λ− 1
1 + λ
µ
−µλ +
λ
1 + λ
σλ.σλ − σλ.σD
¶
So that the riskless rate can be written
r(t) = ρ+ µD +
1
2
λ− 1
1 + λ
µ
−µλ +
λ
1 + λ
σλ.σλ − σλ.σD
¶
− 1
2
(θH(t).θH(t) + θF (t).θF (t))
* By lemma 1, we further know that θH(t) = σD + λ(t)1+λ(t) (σT )
−1


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF

, so that
θH(t).θH(t) = σD.σD + λ(t)1+λ(t)
h
τH DHSH − τF
DF
SF
i
σ−1σD + λ(t)1+λ(t)σ
T
D(σT )
−1


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF


+
³
λ(t)
1+λ(t)
´2 h
τH DHSH − τF
DF
SF
i
(σTσ)−1


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF


And symmetrically θF = σD − 11+λ(t)
¡
σT
¢−1


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF

, so that
θF (t).θF (t) = σD.σD − 11+λ(t)
h
τH DHSH − τF
DF
SF
i
σ−1σD − 11+λ(t)σTD(σT )
−1


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF


+
³
1
1+λ(t)
´2 h
τH DHSH − τF
DF
SF
i
(σTσ)−1


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF


* Putting the pieces together, we get:
r(t) = ρ+ µD − σD.σD
+12
λ−1
1+λ
³
−µλ + λ1+λσλ.σλ − σλ.σD
´
−λ(t)−11+λ(t)
h
τH DHSH − τF
DF
SF
i
σ−1σD
−12
1+λ2(t)
(1+λ(t))2
h
τH DHSH − τF
DF
SF
i
(σTσ)−1


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF


* After a bit of algebra (using the expressions for µλ and σλ given in equation (7)), this expression
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simplifies to
r(t) = ρ+ µD − σD.σD −
λ
(1 + λ)2
σλ.σλ
= ρ+ µD − σD.σD −
λ
(1 + λ)2
·
τH
DH
SH
− τF
DF
SF
¸
(σTσ)−1


τH DHSH
−τF DFSF


• Proof of proposition 5 (restriction on price diﬀusion component)
Apply Ito’s lemma to SH(t) = D(t)1+λ(t)h(δ(t), λ(t)) and focusing on the diﬀusion term gives:
SHσTH =
1
1 + λ
·
h D
µ
hλ −
h
1 + λ
¶
Dhδ
¸


DσTD
λσTλ
δσTδ


⇒ D(t)1+λ(t)hσTH =
1
1+λ
h
h D
³
hλ − h1+λ
´
Dhδ
i


DσTD
λσTλ
δσTδ


⇒ hσTH|{z}
(1,2)
=
·
h
D
µ
hλ −
h
1 + λ
¶
hδ
¸
| {z }
(1,3)


DσTD
λσTλ
δσTδ


(3,2)
= hσTD + λ
³
hλ − h1+λ
´
σTλ + δhδσTδ
Idem for SF (t),
SFσTF =
1
1 + λ
·
λf D
µ
λfλ +
f
1 + λ
¶
λDfδ
¸


DσTD
λσTλ
δσTδ


⇒ λ(t)D(t)1+λ(t) fσ
T
F =
1
1+λ
h
λf D
³
λfλ + f1+λ
´
λDfδ
i


DσTD
λσTλ
δσTδ


⇒ fσTF =
h
f
D
³
fλ + fλ(1+λ)
´
fδ
i


DσTD
λσTλ
δσTδ


= fσTD + λ
³
fλ + fλ(1+λ)
´
σTλ + δfδσTδ
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• Cochrane functions
yH(δ) ≡ E
·Z ∞
0
e−ρ(s−t)δ(s)ds |δ(0) = δ
¸
=
1
ψ(1− γ)
µ
δ
1− δ
¶
F
µ
1, 1− γ; 2− γ; δ
δ − 1
¶
+
1
ψθ
F
µ
1, θ; 1 + θ;
δ − 1
δ
¶
with F the standard (2,1)-hypergeometric function and
ψ =
p
ν2 + 2ρχ2
γ = ν − ψ
χ2
θ =
ν + ψ
χ2
where
ν = µDF − µDH −
σ2DF,1 + σ
2
DF,2
2
+
σ2DH,1 + σ
2
DH,2
2
χ2 =
³
σ2DH,1 + σ
2
DH,2
´
+
³
σ2DF,1 + σ
2
DF,2
´
− 2(σDH,1σDF,1 + σDH,2σDF,2)
And
yF (δ) ≡ E
·Z ∞
0
e−ρ(s−t) (1− δ(s)) ds |δ(0) = δ
¸
=
1
ψ(1 + θ)
µ
1− δ
δ
¶
F
µ
1, 1 + θ; 2 + θ;
δ − 1
δ
¶
− 1
ψγ
F
µ
1,−γ; 1− γ; δ
δ − 1
¶
• Lemma for proposition 6 (first-order expansion of µλ and σλ)
We take first-order Taylor expansions of expressions for σλ and µλ around τ = 0.
— diﬀusion
σλ = τ(σT0 )−1


−
³
DH
SH
´
0³
DF
SF
´
0

+ o(τ)
= τΩ0(δ) + o(τ)
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where we defined
Ω0(δ) ≡ (σT0 )−1


−
³
DH
SH
´
0³
DF
SF
´
0


— drift
µλ = τ
·
−
µ
DH
SH
¶
0
µ
DF
SF
¶
0
¸
σ0−1σD + o(τ)
= τΩT0 σD + o(τ)
We now want to show that ΩT0 (δ)σD(δ) = ρ(1− 2δ). Substituting the definition of Ω0, we have
ΩT0 σD =
·
−
µ
DH
SH
¶
0
µ
DF
SF
¶
0
¸
(σ0)−1σD
which implies
ΩT0 σD =
·
−
µ
DH
SH
¶
0
µ
DF
SF
¶
0
¸
³
SH
SH+SF
´
0³
SF
SH+SF
´
0


because (σ0)−1σD is exactly the vector of stock holdings of a representative agent in an equilibrium
without frictions, which in turn must be equal to the market portfolio. Then, using (SH + SF )0 =
(XH +XF )0 =
D
ρ , we get :
ΩT0 σD = ρ(1− 2δ)
• Proposition 6 (first-order approximation formula for asset prices)
* By lemma in section 2.6, SH(t) = D(t)1+λ(t)h(δ(t), λ(t)) with
h(δ(t), λ(t)) = E
·Z +∞
t
e−ρ(s−t) [1 + λ(s)] δ(s)ds |δ(t), λ(t)
¸
Since dλλ = µλdt+ σ
0
λdW , for s > t0
λ(s) = λ(t0) exp
½Z s
t0
·
µλ −
1
2
σλ.σλ
¸
dt+
Z s
t0
σTλdWt
¾
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Besides, we know by lemma that
σλ = τΩ0(δ) + o(τ)
µλ = τρ(1− 2δ) + o(τ)
where Ω0(δ) is known from Cochrane28 .
Therefore, introducing γ0(δ) = τρ(1− 2δ), we can write
λ(s) = λ(t0) exp
½
τ
·Z s
t0
γ0(δt)dt+
Z s
t0
ΩT0 (δt)dWt
¸
+ o(τ)
¾
⇒ λ(s) = λ(t0)
·
1 + τ
Z s
t0
γ0(δt)dt+ τ
Z s
t0
ΩT0 (δt)dWt
¸
+ o(τ)
and
h(δ(t), λ(t)) = Et
½Z +∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)
·
1 + λ(t) + τλ(t)
Z s
t
γ0(δt0)dt0 + τλ(t)
Z s
t
ΩT0 (δt0)dWt0 + o(τ)
¸
δ(s)ds
¾
⇒ h(δ(t), λ(t)) = (1 + λ(t))Et
·Z +∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)δ(s)ds
¸
+τλ(t)Et
·Z +∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)
·Z s
t
γ0(δt0)dt0 +
Z s
t
ΩT0 (δt0)dWt0
¸
δ(s)ds
¸
| {z }
≡−H(δ(t))
+ o(τ)
⇒ h(δ(t), λ(t)) = (1 + λ(t))yH(δ(t))− τλ(t)H(δ(t)) + o(τ)
Then SH and SF are given by
SH(Dt, δt, λt; τ) = Dt
·
yH(δt)− τ
λt
1 + λt
H(δt)
¸
+ o(τ)
SF (Dt, δt, λt; τ) = Dt
·
yF (δt)− τ
1
1 + λt
F (δt)
¸
+ o(τ)
We have to show that functions H and F verify the following boundary value problem
28 It is given by:
Ω0(δ) ≡ (σT0 )−1

 −
³
DH
SH
´
0³
DF
SF
´
0


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


ρH − δµδH 0 − 12δ
2σTδ σδH 00 = −
£
ρ(1− 2δ)yH +
¡
σTδ Ω0
¢
y0H
¤
= δ
H(0) = 0
H(1) = 1ρ



ρF − δµδF 0 − 12δ
2σTδ σδF 00 = ρ(1− 2δ)yF +
£
σTδ Ω0
¤
y0F = 1− δ
F (0) = 1ρ
F (1) = 0
* We can then rewrite the PDE for h (equation (9)) by using this first-order approximation and
by taking into account that Feynmac-Kac applied to yH(.) (which implies ρyH = (1 + λ)δ + δµδy0H +
1
2δ
2(σTδ σδ)y
00
H) to get:
ρH(δ) = δµδH 0(δ) +
1
2
δ2σTδ σδH 00(δ)− ρ(1− 2δ)yH(δ)− δ
£
σTδ (δ)Ω0(δ)
¤
y0H(δ)
The first boundary condition follows from the fact that given the nature of the dividend process
SH(D, 0, λ) = 0
The necessity of the second boundary condition can be seen from the fact that it must be the case
that
lim
λ→∞
SH(D, 1, λ) =
(1− τ)D
ρ
Indeed, when δ goes to 1 and λ goes to infinity, the economy tends to an economy with one tree
only (D = DH) and one investor located in the foreign country, thus facing an after-tax dividend stream
(1− τ)D.
* In the same way, we characterize the foreign asset price through a function F solution of a PDE
with analogous boundary conditions (see in the text).
* We now prove that the non homogenous terms in the PDEs can be rewritten:
ρ(1− 2δ)yH + δ
¡
σTδ Ω0
¢
y0H = −δ
ρ(1− 2δ)yF + δ
¡
σTδ Ω0
¢
y0F = 1− δ
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To do that we use the fact that in the equilibrium without frictions (Cochrane & al.), the restriction
on price diﬀusion components takes the following form:
σH0 = σD +
y0H
yH
δσδ
σF0 = σD +
y0F
yF
δσδ
Then :
σ−10 σH0 = σ−10 σD + δ
y0H
yH
σ−10 σδ
=


³
SH
SH+SF
´
0³
SF
SH+SF
´
0

+ δ
y0H
yH
σ−10 σδ
where the second equality follows from the fact that in the equilibrium without frictions σ0−1σD is
exactly the vector of stock holdings of a representative agent, which must be equal to the market portfolio.
Symmetrically,
σ−10 σF0 =


³
SH
SH+SF
´
0³
SF
SH+SF
´
0

+ δ
y0F
yF
σ−10 σδ.
Then, since σ0 = (σH0 σF0) we have :
I2 = σ−10 σ0 =


³
SH
SH+SF
´
0³
SF
SH+SF
´
0
³
SH
SH+SF
´
0³
SF
SH+SF
´
0

+
·
δ
y0H
yH
σ−10 σδ δ
y0F
yF
σ−10 σδ
¸
⇒
·
−
µ
DH
SH
¶
0
µ
DF
SF
¶
0
¸
= [ρ(1− 2δ) ρ(1− 2δ)] +
·
δ
¡
σTδ Ω0
¢T y0H
yH
δ
¡
σTδ Ω0
¢T y0F
yF
¸
⇒
·
−
µ
DH
SH
yH
¶
0
µ
DF
SF
yF
¶
0
¸
= [−δ (1− δ)]
=
£
ρ(1− 2δ)yH + δ
¡
σTδ Ω0
¢
y0H ρ(1− 2δ)yF + δ
¡
σTδ Ω0
¢
y0F
¤
QED.
43
Then, it is immediate that yH and yF are solutions of the boundary value problems above (by definition
of yH and yF ).
This gives the first-order development for SH and SF :
SH(Dt, δt, λt; τ) = Dt
·
1− τ λt
1 + λt
¸
yH(δt) + o(τ)
SF (Dt, δt, λt; τ) = Dt
·
1− τ 1
1 + λt
¸
yF (δt) + o(τ)
• Lemma for proposition 7 (second-order expansion of µλ and σλ)
* We can easily prove that ¡
σT
¢−1
=
¡
σT0
¢−1
+ o(τ)
* We can also write
DH
SH
=
µ
DH
SH
¶
0
·
1 + τ λt
1 + λt
¸
+ o(τ)
DF
SF
=
µ
DF
SF
¶
0
·
1 +
τ
1 + λt
¸
+ o(τ)
Indeed
DH
SH
=
DH
D
D
SH
=
DH
D
1
yH(δt)
³
1− τ λt1+λt
´
+ o(τ)
=
µ
DH
SH
¶
0
+ τ λt
1 + λt
µ
DH
SH
¶
0
+ o(τ)
DF
SF
=
DF
D
·
yF (δt)(1− τ
1
1 + λt
)
¸−1
=
µ
DF
SF
¶
0
+ τ 1
1 + λt
µ
DF
SF
¶
0
+ o(τ)
* Then we can write second-order approximations of the parameters µλ and σλ governing the dynamic
of λ :
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— diﬀusion
σλ = τ
¡
σT0
¢−1


−DHSH
DF
SF


= τΩ0 + τ2Ω1 + o(τ2)
with : Ω1 = 11+λ
¡
σT0
¢−1


−λ
³
DH
SH
´
0³
DF
SF
´
0


— drift
µλ = σTλσD +
1
1 + λ(t)
σTλσλ
= τΩT0 σD + τ2
¡
ΩT1 σD
¢
+ τ2 1
1 + λ
¡
ΩT0Ω0
¢
+ o(τ2)
= τρ(1− 2δ) + τ2
¡
ΩT1 σD
¢
+ τ2 1
1 + λ
¡
ΩT0Ω0
¢
+ o(τ2)
= τρ(1− 2δ) + τ2
·
ρ
1 + λ
− ρδ + 1
1 + λ
¡
ΩT0Ω0
¢¸
+ o(τ2)
* To complete the proof and get the final expression for µλ, we just have to reexpress ΩT1 σD.
Just as for the first order approximation :
ΩT1 σD =
1
1 + λ
µ
−λ
µ
DH
SH
¶
0
µ
DF
SF
¶
0
¶
(σ0)−1 σD
=
ρ
1 + λ
(−λδ + 1− δ)
=
ρ
1 + λ
− ρδ
• Proof of proposition 7 (second order approximation of asset prices)
* We work on h(δ, λ) ≡ E
hR +∞
t e
−ρ(s−t) [1 + λ(s)] δ(s)ds |δ(t) = δ, λ(t) = λ
i
. Like in section 3.1, we
show that a second-order approximation of h is given by
h(δ, λ; τ) = (1 + λ) yH(δ)− τλyH(δ) + τ2λH2(δ, λ) + o(τ2)
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* Plugging into the PDE for h (equation 9) and identifying second-order terms, we get the following
PDE for H2
ρH2 = δµδ
∂H2
∂δ
+
1
2
δ2(σTδ σδ)
∂2H2
∂δ2
+
·
ρ
1 + λ
− ρδ + 1
1 + λ
¡
ΩT0Ω0
¢
− ρ(1− 2δ)
¸
yH + δ(σTδ Ω1 − σTδ Ω0)y0H
* We now want to simplify the expression for the non-homogenous term. We already know that :
−
£
ρ(1− 2δ)yH + δσTδ Ω0y0H0
¤
= δ. We are going to show that :
µ
ρ
1 + λ
− ρδ
¶
yH + δ(σTδ Ω1)y0H = −
λ
1 + λ
δ.
We use the same reasoning as for the first-order approximation :
I2 = σ−10 σ0 =


³
SH
SH+SF
´
0³
SF
SH+SF
´
0
³
SH
SH+SF
´
0³
SF
SH+SF
´
0

+
·
δ y
0
H
yH
σ−10 σδ δ
y0F
yF
σ−10 σδ
¸
⇒
·
−
µ
λDH
SH
¶
0
µ
DF
SF
¶
0
¸
= [ρ(1− (1 + λ)δ) ρ(1− (1 + λ)δ)] +
·
δ
¡
σTδ Ω1
¢T y0H
yH
δ
¡
σTδ Ω1
¢T y0F
yF
¸
⇒
·
−
µ
λDH
SH
yH
¶
0
µ
DF
SF
yF
¶
0
¸
= [ρ(1− (1 + λ)δ)yH ρ(1− (1 + λ)δ)yF ]+
h
δ
¡
σTδ Ω1
¢T y0H δ ¡σTδ Ω1¢T y0F i
⇒ 1
1 + λ
[−λδ 1− δ] = 1
1 + λ
h
ρ(1− (1 + λ)δ)yH + δ
¡
σTδ Ω1
¢T y0H ρ(1− (1 + λ)δ)yF + δ ¡σTδ Ω1¢T y0F i
* Hence, by rewriting the non-homogenous term in the PDE for H2, we get :
ρH2 = δµδ
∂H2
∂δ
+
1
2
δ2(σTδ σδ)
∂2H2
∂δ2
+
1
1 + λ
δ + 1
1 + λ
¡
ΩT0Ω0
¢
yH
* Then, we can show that there exists a function h2 such that H2(δ, λ) = 11+λ [yH(δ) + h2(δ)] and h2
verifies :
ρh2 = δµδh02 +
1
2
δ2(σTδ σδ)h002 +
¡
ΩT0Ω0
¢
yH
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(we just use the following property : ρyH = δµδy0H + 12δ
2(σTδ σδ)y00H + δ
* Respectively for f , we can show that
f(δ, λ; τ) = 1 + λ
λ
yF (δ)−
τ
λ
yF (δ) +
τ2
λ
F2(δ, λ) + o(τ2)
with F2(δ, λ) satisfying the following diﬀerential equation
ρF2 = δµδ
∂F2
∂δ
+
1
2
δ2(σTδ σδ)
∂2F2
∂δ2
+ρ(1−2δ)yF−
·
ρ
1 + λ
− ρδ
¸
yF+δ(σTδ Ω0)y0F−δ(σTδ Ω1)y0F+
λ
1 + λ
¡
ΩT0Ω0
¢
yF
And we can rewrite the non-homogenous term in this PDE using
ρ(1− 2δ)yF + δ(σTδ Ω0)y0F = 1− δ
and
1
1 + λ
[ρ(1− (1 + λ)δ)yF ] +
1
1 + λ
δ
¡
σTδ Ω1
¢T y0F = 1− δ1 + λ
to obtain
ρF2 = δµδ
∂F2
∂δ
+
1
2
δ2(σTδ σδ)
∂2F2
∂δ2
+ (1− δ) λ
1 + λ
+
λ
(1 + λ)
¡
ΩT0Ω0
¢
yF
We then introduce the function f2 such that F2(δ, λ) = λ1+λ [yF (δ) + f2(δ)] and show that it is solution
of the ODE given in the text.
* Boundary Conditions
At this stage, we know that
SH(D, δ, λ; τ) = D
"
yH(δ)
Ã
1− τ λ
1 + λ
+ τ2 λ
(1 + λ)2
!
+ τ2 λ
(1 + λ)2
h2(δ)
#
+ o(τ2)
SF (D, δ, λ; τ) = D
·
yF (δ)
µ
1− τ 1
1 + λ
+ τ2 λ
(1 + λ)2
¶
+ τ2 λ
(1 + λ)2
f2(δ)
¸
+ o(τ2)
The conditions h2(0) = f2(1) = 0 are required since the price of non-existing assets must be zero.
The derivation of the other two boundary conditions (on h2(1) and f2(0)) is more tricky.
When δ → 1, SH(t) tends to
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DH(t)
1 + λt
E
·Z +∞
t
e−ρ(s−t) [1 + λ(s)] ds |λ(t)
¸
Let us define φ(λt; τ) ≡ E
hR +∞
t e
−ρ(s−t) [1 + λ(s)] ds |λ(t)
i
, so that limδ→1 SH(D, δ, λ; τ) = D1+λφ(λt; τ).
Using Feynman-Kac :
ρφ(λ) = (1 + λ) + λµ¯λφ
0(λ) + 1
2
λ2σ¯λ.σ¯λφ00(λ) (17)
where µ¯λ = limδ→1(µλ) and σ¯λ = limδ→1(σλ), i.e.
σ¯λ = τΩ0(1) + τ2Ω1(1)
µ¯λ = −τρ+ τ2
·
− λρ
1 + λ
+
1
1 + λ
¡
ΩT0 (1)Ω0(1
¢
)
¸
Besides, we know that h2 is such that at the second-order in τ :
h(δ, λ) = (1 + λ) yH(δ)− τλyH(δ) + τ2
λ
1 + λ
[yH(δ) + h2(δ)]
Taking the limit when δ goes to 1, we get
lim
δ→1
h(δ, λ) = φ(λ) = 1
ρ
·
1 + λ− τλ+ τ2 λ
(1 + λ)
+ τ2 λ
(1 + λ)
ρh2(1)
¸
From this, we can compute φ0(λ) and φ00(λ) and plug the expressions for φ and its derivatives in
equation (17). Then, identifying second-order terms in the diﬀerential equation, we get :
λ
1 + λ
ρh2(1) =
1
ρ
λ
1 + λ
¡
ΩT0 (1)Ω0(1
¢
)
⇒ h2(1) =
1
ρ2
ΩT0 (1)Ω0(1)
Symmetrically :
f2(0) =
1
ρ
(1 +
1
ρ
ΩT0 (0)Ω0(0))
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• Proof of proposition 8 (second order approximation of price diﬀusion)
We start from proposition 5
σH = σD + δ
hδ
h
σδ + λ
µ
hλ
h
− 1
1 + λ
¶
σλ
From h(δ, λ) = (1 + λ) yH(δ)− τλyH(δ) + τ2 λ1+λh2(δ), we get the following second order approxima-
tions:
1
h
=
1
(1 + λ)yH
·
1 + τ λ
1 + λ
− τ2 λ
(1 + λ)2
h2
yH
¸
hδ = (1 + λ) y0H − τλy0H + τ2
λ
1 + λ
h02
hλ = yH − τyH + τ2
h2
(1 + λ)2
Then, using σλ = τΩ0 + τ2Ω1, we compute σH by retaining only terms of order less or equal to 2:
σH = σH0 + τ2
λ
(1 + λ)2
½
−Ω0 +
·
h02
yH
− λy
0
H
yH
− h2y
0
H
(yH)2
¸
δσδ
¾
In the same way, starting from σF = σD + δ fδf σδ + λ
³
fλ
f +
1
λ(1+λ)
´
σλ, we get
σF = σF0 + τ2
λ
(1 + λ)2
½
Ω0 +
·
f 02
yF
− 1
λ
y0F
yF
− f2y
0
F
(yF )2
¸
δσδ
¾
.
• Approximate portfolio choice
eH = ταFHDH
= τ
DH
SH
αFHSH
αFHSH is the amount that foreign investors invest in the domestic asset. At the first order, investors
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hold the world market portfolio, therefore:
eH = τ
DH
SH
SH
SH + SF
XF + o(τ)
= τ
DH
SH + SF
XF + o(τ)
= τ DH
D
D
SH + SF
XF + o(τ)
= τδρXF + o(τ)
XH(t) = cH(t)
·
1
ρ
− Et
Z ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t) eH(s)
cH(s)
ds
¸
XH(t) = cH(t)
·
1
ρ
− τEt
Z ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)δ(s)ρXF (s)
cH(s)
ds
¸
+ o(τ)
cH = D1+λ and XF =
λ
1+λ (XH +XF ) + o(τ)
ρXF
cH
= ρ
λXH
cH
+ o(τ)
= λ+ o(τ)
Since for s > t, λ(s) = λ(t) + o(τ), we get
XH(t) = cH(t)


1
ρ
− τλtEt
Z ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)δ(s)ds| {z }
≡yH(δ(t))

+ o(τ)
From this, we can derive (identifying diﬀusion terms)


SHαHH
XH
SFαHF
XH

 = σ
−1σD + τ
λ
1 + λ
¡
σTσ
¢−1


DH
SH
−DFSF

+ ²H
where : ²H = τλ SHSF(SH+SF )2


−1
1


Respectively: ²F = τ 1λ
SHSF
(SH+SF )2


−1
1


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